Kittle, S orcid.org/0000-0002-6056-4970 (2021) How (not) to think about the sense of ‘able’ relevant to free will. Inquiry, 65 (10). pp. 1289-1307. ISSN 0020-174X
Abstract
This essay is an investigation into the sense of ‘able’ relevant to free will, where free will is understood as requiring the ability to do otherwise. I argue that van Inwagen's recent functional specification of the relevant sense of ‘able’ is flawed, and that explicating the powers involved in free will shall likely require paying detailed attention to the semantics and pragmatics of ‘can’ and ‘able’. Further, I argue that van Inwagen's promise-level ability requirement on free will is too strong. I also argue that Mele's conjecture that the strength of the ability to perform the ‘alternative’ action (i.e. to refrain, to decide otherwise) be no higher than the strength of the ability exercised in performing an action is mistaken. I suggest there is an asymmetry in the strengths of the abilities which make up the n-way power that comprises free will, and that this looks to have some interesting consequences for the connection between the abilities required for free will and, e.g. the ‘up to us’ locution.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Authors/Creators: |
|
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an author produced version of an article published in Inquiry. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | Free will; ability; moral responsibility; able; can |
Dates: |
|
Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 02 Oct 2020 12:09 |
Last Modified: | 17 Nov 2022 11:37 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Taylor & Francis |
Identification Number: | 10.1080/0020174X.2021.1904645 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:166216 |