Bradley, D (2021) Bayesianism and Self-Doubt. Synthese, 199 (1-2). pp. 2225-2243. ISSN 0039-7857
Abstract
How should we respond to evidence when our evidence indicates that we are rationally impaired? I will defend a novel answer based on the analogy between self-doubt and memory loss. To believe that one is now impaired and previously was not is to believe that one’s epistemic position has deteriorated. Memory loss is also a form of epistemic deterioration. I argue that agents who suffer from epistemic deterioration should return to the priors they had at an earlier time. I develop this argument regarding memory loss then extend it to cases of self-doubt.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © The Author(s) 2020. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. |
Keywords: | Self-doubt; Forgetting; Bayesianism |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) |
Funding Information: | Funder Grant number British Academy MD19\190046 |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 16 Oct 2020 14:31 |
Last Modified: | 25 Jun 2023 22:26 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Springer |
Identification Number: | 10.1007/s11229-020-02879-7 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:166214 |
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