Elliott, E orcid.org/0000-0002-4387-7967 (2022) Comparativism and the Measurement of Partial Belief. Erkenntnis: an international journal of analytic philosophy, 87 (6). pp. 2843-2870. ISSN 0165-0106
Abstract
According to comparativism, degrees of belief are reducible to a system of purely ordinal comparisons of relative confidence. (For example, being more confident that P than that Q, or being equally confident that P and that Q.) In this paper, I raise several general challenges for comparativism, relating to (1) its capacity to illuminate apparently meaningful claims regarding intervals and ratios of strengths of belief, (2) its capacity to draw enough intuitively meaningful and theoretically relevant distinctions between doxastic states, and (3) its capacity to handle common instances of irrationality.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © The Author(s) 2020. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Funding Information: | Funder Grant number EU - European Union GA 703959 |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 14 Sep 2020 11:08 |
Last Modified: | 25 May 2023 07:52 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Springer |
Identification Number: | 10.1007/s10670-020-00329-x |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:165486 |