Aygün, Orhan and Lanari Bo, Inacio (Accepted: 2020) College Admission with Multidimensional Privileges: The Brazilian Affirmative Action Case. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. ISSN 1945-7669 (In Press)
Abstract
In 2012 Brazilian public universities were mandated to use affirmative action policies for candidates from racial and income minorities. We show that the policy makes the students' affirmative action status a strategic choice, and may reject high-achieving minority students while admitting low-achieving majority students. Empirical data shows evidence consistent with this type of unfairness in more than 49\% of the programs. We propose a selection criterion and an incentive-compatible mechanism that, for a wider range of similar problems and the one in Brazil in particular, removes any gain from strategizing over the privileges claimed and is fair.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Authors/Creators: |
|
Keywords: | mechanism design,matching with contracts,college admissions,affirmative action,diversity |
Dates: |
|
Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > Economics and Related Studies (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 10 Jul 2020 13:20 |
Last Modified: | 16 Oct 2024 16:46 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20170364 |
Status: | In Press |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1257/mic.20170364 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:163090 |