Keiser, J (2021) On Meaning Without Use. Journal of Philosophy, 118 (1). pp. 5-27. ISSN 0022-362X
Abstract
This paper defends the use-based metasemantic project against the problem of meaning without use, which allegedly shows the predictions of use-based metasemantic accounts to be indeterminate with respect to unusably long or complex expressions. This criticism is commonly taken to be decisive, prompting various retreats and contributing to the project’s eventual decline. Using metasemantic conventionalism as a case study, I argue the following: either such expressions do not belong to used languages or their meanings are uniquely determined by use. Thus, the alleged problem of meaning without use offers no challenge to the use-based metasemantic project generally, nor to conventionalism in particular.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2021 The Journal of Philosophy, Inc. This is the peer-reviewed version of the following article: Keiser, J (2021) On Meaning Without Use. Journal of Philosophy, 118 (1). pp. 5-27, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil202111811. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes only. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) |
Funding Information: | Funder Grant number EU - European Union 845374 |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 17 Jun 2020 13:38 |
Last Modified: | 01 Jan 2022 01:38 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Journal of Philosophy |
Identification Number: | 10.5840/jphil202111811 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:161958 |