Weinberger, N and Bradley, S orcid.org/0000-0001-9663-7919 (2020) Making sense of non-factual disagreement in science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 83. pp. 36-43. ISSN 0039-3681
Abstract
Philosophical discussions of disagreement typically focus on cases in which the disagreeing agents are aware that they are disagreeing and can pinpoint the proposition that they are disagreeing about. Scientific disagreements are not, in general, like this. Here we consider several case studies of disagreements that do not concern first-order factual claims about the scientific domain in question, but rather boil down to disputes regarding methodology. In such cases, it is often difficult to identify the point of contention in the dispute. Philosophers of science have a useful role to play in pinpointing the source of such disagreements, but must resist the temptation to trace scientific debates to disputes over higher-level philosophical accounts.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2020, Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This is an author produced version of an article published in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 02 Mar 2020 11:02 |
Last Modified: | 24 Feb 2025 14:07 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Elsevier |
Identification Number: | 10.1016/j.shpsa.2020.01.004 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:157862 |