Murphy, A orcid.org/0000-0002-3707-6872 (2020) Towards a Pluralist Account of the Imagination in Science. Philosophy of Science, 87 (5). pp. 957-967. ISSN 0031-8248
Abstract
Typically, the imagination in thought experiments has been taken to consist in mental images; we visualize the state of affairs described. A recent alternative from Fiora Salis and Roman Frigg maintains that it is only the propositional imagination that is necessary for the conduct of a thought experiment. I set out problems with these monistic accounts and develop a pluralist stance. Thought experiments appeal to a variety of our imaginative capacities, and we ought to focus on the function of particular thought experiments when considering what type of imaginative engagement they invite.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Authors/Creators: |
|
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | Copyright 2020 by the Philosophy of Science Association. This is an author produced version of a journal article published in Philosophy of Science. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
|
Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 09 Dec 2019 10:46 |
Last Modified: | 01 Dec 2021 01:38 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | University of Chicago Press |
Identification Number: | 10.1086/710620 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:154289 |