Golub, C orcid.org/0000-0003-3934-5842 (2019) Reid on Moral Sentimentalism. Res Philosophica, 96 (4). pp. 431-444. ISSN 2168-9105
Abstract
In the Essays on the Active Powers of Man V. 7, Thomas Reid seeks to show “[t]hat moral approbation implies a real judgment,” contrasting this thesis with the view that moral approbation is no more than a feeling. Unfortunately, his criticism of moral sentimentalism systematically conflates two different metaethical views: non-cognitivism about moral thought and subjectivism about moral properties. However, if we properly disentangle the various parts of Reid’s discussion, we can isolate pertinent arguments against each of these views. Some of these arguments, such as the argument from disagreement and the argument from implausible counterfactuals against subjectivism, or the transparency argument against non-cognitivism, still have important roles to play in contemporary metaethics.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: | |
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2019, Camil Golub, © 2019, Res Philosophica. This is an author produced version of a journal article published in Res Philosophica. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 05 Nov 2019 13:16 |
Last Modified: | 01 Oct 2020 00:38 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Philosophy Documentation Centre: Res Philosophica |
Identification Number: | 10.11612/resphil.1815 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:153084 |