Golub, C orcid.org/0000-0003-3934-5842 (2017) Expressivism and the Reliability Challenge. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 20 (4). pp. 797-811. ISSN 1386-2820
Abstract
Suppose that there are objective normative facts and our beliefs about such facts are by-and-large true. How did this come to happen? This is the reliability challenge to normative realism. As has been recently noted, the challenge also applies to expressivist “quasi-realism”. I argue that expressivism is useful in the face of this challenge, in a way that has not been yet properly articulated. In dealing with epistemological issues, quasi-realists typically invoke the desire-like nature of normative judgments. However, this is not enough to prevent the reliability challenge from arising, given that quasi-realists also hold that normative judgments are truth-apt beliefs. To defuse this challenge, we need to isolate a deeper sense in which normative thought is not representational. I propose that we rely on the negative functional thesis of expressivism: normative thought does not have the function of tracking normative facts, or any other kind of facts. This thesis supports an argument to the effect that it is misguided to expect an explanation of our access to normative facts akin to the explanations available in regions of thought that have a tracking function. We should be content with explanations of our reliability that take for granted certain connections between our psychology and the normative truths.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: | |
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | Expressivism; Quasi-realism; Reliability challenge; Function;Tracking |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 17 Oct 2019 15:07 |
Last Modified: | 18 Oct 2019 02:02 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Springer |
Identification Number: | 10.1007/s10677-017-9794-1 |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:152189 |