Golub, C orcid.org/0000-0003-3934-5842 (2017) Expressivism and realist explanations. Philosophical Studies, 174 (6). pp. 1385-1409. ISSN 0031-8116
Abstract
It is often claimed that there is an explanatory divide between an expressivist account of normative discourse and a realist conception of normativity: more precisely, that expressivism and realism offer conflicting explanations of (1) the metaphysical structure of the normative realm, (2) the connection between normative judgment and motivation, (3) our normative beliefs and any convergence thereof, or (4) the content of normative thoughts and claims. In this paper I argue that there need be no such explanatory conflict. Given a minimalist approach to the relevant metaphysical and semantic notions, expressivism is compatible with any explanation that would be acceptable as a general criterion for realism.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: | |
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Philosophical Studies. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | Expressivism; Realism; Quasi-realism;Explanation |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 17 Oct 2019 13:07 |
Last Modified: | 18 Oct 2019 02:03 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Springer |
Identification Number: | 10.1007/s11098-016-0764-6 |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:152188 |