Golub, C orcid.org/0000-0003-3934-5842 (2019) Personal Value, Biographical Identity, and Retrospective Attitudes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 97 (1). pp. 72-85. ISSN 0004-8402
Abstract
We all could have had better lives, yet often do not wish that our lives had gone differently, especially when we contemplate alternatives that vastly diverge from our actual life course. What, if anything, accounts for such conservative retrospective attitudes? I argue that the right answer involves the significance of our personal attachments and our biographical identity. I also examine other options, such as the absence of self-to-self connections across possible worlds and a general conservatism about value.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: | |
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2018 Australasian Association of Philosophy. This is an author produced version of a paper published in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | personal value, biographical identity, regret, affirmation |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 17 Oct 2019 12:52 |
Last Modified: | 18 Oct 2019 01:41 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Taylor & Francis |
Identification Number: | 10.1080/00048402.2018.1431297 |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:152187 |