Bhattacharya, A., Brosi, V. and Ciardiello, F. (2018) The uncovered set and the core: Cox's result revisited. Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 3 (1). pp. 1-15. ISSN 2399-844X
Abstract
In this work first it is shown, in contradiction to the well-known claim in Cox (1987), that the uncovered set in a multidimensional spatial voting situation (under the usual regularity conditions) does not necessarily coincide with the core even when the core is singleton: in particular, the posited coincidence result, while true for an odd number of voters, may cease to be true when the number of voters is even. Second we provide a characterisation result for the case with an even number of voters: a singleton core is the uncovered set in this case if and only if the unique element in the core is the Condorcet winner.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © Bhattacharya, Brosi, Ciardiello. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License 3.0, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0. |
Keywords: | Spatial voting games; uncovered set; core |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Management School (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 10 Jun 2019 08:37 |
Last Modified: | 10 Jun 2019 08:37 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.22574/jmid.2018.12.001 |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:147097 |