Woods, J (2019) Against Reflective Equilibrium for Logical Theorizing. The Australasian Journal of Logic, 16 (7). pp. 319-341. ISSN 1448-5052
Abstract
I distinguish two ways of developing anti-exceptionalist approaches to logical revision. The first emphasizes comparing the theoretical virtuousness of developed bodies of logical theories, such as classical and intuitionistic logic. I'll call this whole theory comparison. The second attempts local repairs to problematic bits of our logical theories, such as dropping excluded middle (and modifying elsewhere accordingly) to deal with intuitions about vagueness. I'll call this the piecemeal approach. I then briefly discuss a problem I've developed elsewhere for comparisons of logical theories. Essentially, the problem is that a pair of logics may each evaluate the alternative as superior to themselves, resulting in oscillation between logical options. The piecemeal approach offers a way out of this problem and
thereby might seem a preferable to whole theory comparisons. I go on to show that reflective equilibrium, the best known piecemeal method, has deep problems of its own when applied to logic.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Keywords: | Reflective Equilibrium; Theory Choice; Anti-Exceptionalism; Validity |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 20 Mar 2019 13:33 |
Last Modified: | 20 Nov 2019 16:07 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Australasian Association of Logic and the Centre for Logic, Language and Computation, Victoria University |
Identification Number: | 10.26686/ajl.v16i7.5927 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:143854 |