Bradley, D (2020) Naturalness as a Constraint on Priors. Mind, 129 (513). pp. 179-203. ISSN 0026-4423
Abstract
Many epistemological problems can be solved by the objective Bayesian view that there are rationality constraints on priors, that is, inductive probabilities. But attempts to work out these constraints have run into such serious problems that many have rejected objective Bayesianism altogether. I argue that the epistemologist should borrow the metaphysician’s concept of naturalness and assign higher priors to more natural hypotheses.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © Bradley 2019. This is an author produced version of an article published in Mind. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 19 Feb 2019 15:59 |
Last Modified: | 20 Jun 2021 00:38 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
Identification Number: | 10.1093/mind/fzz027 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:142715 |