Väyrynen, P orcid.org/0000-0003-4066-8577 (2019) Reasons why in normative explanation. Inquiry: an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy, 62 (6). pp. 607-623. ISSN 0020-174X
Abstract
Normative explanations, which specify why things have the normative features they do, are ubiquitous in normative theory and ordinary thought. But there is much less work on normative explanation than on scientific or metaphysical explanation. Skow [2016. Reasons Why. Oxford: Oxford University Press] argues that a complete answer to the question why some fact Q occurs consists in all of the reasons why Q occurs. This paper explores this theory as a case study of a general theory that promises to offer us a grip on normative explanation which is independent of particular normative theories. I first argue that the theory doesn't give an adequate account of certain enablers of reasons which are important in normative explanation. I then formulate and reject three responses on behalf of the theory. But I suggest that since theories of this general sort have the right kind of resources to illuminate how normative explanation might be similar to and different from explanations in other domains, they nonetheless merit further exploration by normative theorists.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Inquiry: an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | Normative explanation; Why-questions; Reasons why; Enablers |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 31 Oct 2018 14:22 |
Last Modified: | 09 Jul 2020 00:38 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Routledge |
Identification Number: | 10.1080/0020174X.2018.1562376 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:137962 |