Ó Laoghaire, T (2018) Making Offers They Can’t Refuse: Consensus and Domination in the WTO. Moral Philosophy and Politics, 5 (2). pp. 227-256. ISSN 2194-5616
Abstract
The World Trade Organisation (WTO), and the international trade regime within which it operates, is regularly evaluated in terms of distributive outcomes or opportunities. A less-established concern is the extent to which the institutional structure of the trade regime enables agents to exert control over the economic forces to which they’re subject. This oversight is surprising, as trade negotiations amongst states have profound impacts upon what options remain open to those states and their citizens in regulating their economies. This article contributes to filling this lacuna in the literature. Following on from recent neo-republican work on global and international justice, it argues that a major problem with the WTO is that it fails to effectively mitigate the domination of some states by others within its negotiations. Such domination prevails despite the employment of negative consensus as a decision-making procedure.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Moral Philosophy and Politics. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | WTO; negative consensus; trade justice; neo-republicanism; domination |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 16 Oct 2018 08:13 |
Last Modified: | 08 Nov 2019 01:38 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | De Gruyter |
Identification Number: | 10.1515/mopp-2018-0061 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:137088 |