Bradley, S orcid.org/0000-0001-9663-7919 (2019) A Counterexample to Three Imprecise Decision Theories. Theoria, 85 (1). pp. 18-30. ISSN 0040-5825
Abstract
There is currently much discussion about how decision making should proceed when an agent’s degrees of belief are imprecise; represented by a set of probability functions. I show that decision rules recently discussed by Sarah Moss, Susanna Rinard and Rohan Sud all suffer from the same defect: they all struggle to rationalise diachronic ambiguity aversion. Since ambiguity aversion is among the motivations for imprecise credence, this suggests that the search for an adequate imprecise decision rule is not yet over.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2018 Stiftelsen Theoria. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Bradley, S (2018) A Counterexample to Three Imprecise Decision Theories. Theoria. ISSN 0040-5825, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12170. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. |
Keywords: | decision theory; formal epistemology; imprecise probability |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) |
Funding Information: | Funder Grant number EU - European Union 792292 |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 20 Sep 2018 16:02 |
Last Modified: | 27 Nov 2019 01:38 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Wiley |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/theo.12170 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:135961 |