Gamester, W orcid.org/0000-0003-4376-4433 (2019) Logic, logical form and the disunity of truth. Analysis, 79 (1). pp. 34-43. ISSN 0003-2638
Abstract
Monists say that the nature of truth is invariant, whichever sentence you consider; pluralists say that the nature of truth varies between different sets of sentences. The orthodoxy is that logic and logical form favour monism: there must be a single property that is preserved in any valid inference; and any truth-functional complex must be true in the same way as its components. The orthodoxy, I argue, is mistaken. Logic and logical form impose only structural constraints on a metaphysics of truth. Monistic theories are not guaranteed to satisfy these constraints, and there is a pluralistic theory that does so.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2018, The Author(s). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Analysis. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 11 Sep 2018 16:16 |
Last Modified: | 29 Nov 2019 02:13 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
Identification Number: | 10.1093/analys/anx165 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:135486 |