Isserow, J orcid.org/0000-0001-5900-8363 and Klein, C (2017) Hypocrisy and Moral Authority. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 12 (2). pp. 191-222. ISSN 1559-3061
Abstract
Hypocrites invite moral opprobrium, and charges of hypocrisy are a significant and widespread feature of our moral lives. Yet it remains unclear what hypocrites have in common, or what is distinctively bad about them. We propose that hypocrites are persons who have undermined their claim to moral authority. Since this self-undermining can occur in a number of ways, our account construes hypocrisy as multiply realizable. As we explain, a person’s moral authority refers to a kind of standing that they occupy within a particular moral community. This status is both socially important and normatively precarious. Hence, moral agents are right to be vigilant when it comes to hypocrisy, and are often justified in their outrage when they detect it. We further argue that our view can preserve what is attractive in rival accounts, while avoiding their associated problems.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2017 Authors. This is an open access article under the terms of the Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 10 Sep 2018 11:05 |
Last Modified: | 12 Sep 2018 10:18 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | University of Southern California |
Identification Number: | 10.26556/jesp.v12i2.224 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:135457 |
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