Woods, J (2018) Footing the Cost (of Normative Subjectivism). In: Suikkanen, J and Kauppinen, A, (eds.) Methodology and Moral Philosophy. Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory, 1 . Routledge , Abingdon, UK ISBN 9781138322097
Abstract
I defend normative subjectivism against the charge that believing in it undermines the functional role of normative judgment. In particular, I defend it against the claim that believing that our reasons change from context to context is problematic for our use of normative judgment. To do so, I distinguish two senses of normative universality and normative reasons---evaluative universality and reasons and ontic universality and reasons. The former captures how even subjectivists can evaluate the actions of those subscribing to other conventions; the latter explicates how their reasons differ from ours. I then show that four central aspects of the functional role of normativity---evaluation of our and others actions and reasons, normative communication, hypothetical planning, and evaluating counternromative conditionals---require far less than full ontic universality. The upshot is that there's no serious problem for subjectivism along these lines.
Metadata
Item Type: | Book Section |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2019, Taylor and Francis. This is an author produced version of a book chapter published by Taylor & Francis in Methodology and Moral Philosophy, available online at https://www.routledge.com/9781138322097. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | Relativism; Subjectivism; Phillipa Foot |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 10 Sep 2018 14:13 |
Last Modified: | 01 May 2020 00:38 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Routledge |
Series Name: | Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:135305 |