Divers, J orcid.org/0000-0002-1286-6587 (2018) W(h)ither Metaphysical Necessity? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 92 (1). pp. 1-25. ISSN 0309-7013
Abstract
I argue that a pragmatic scepticism about metaphysical modality is a perfectly reasonable position to maintain. I then illustrate the difficulties and limitations associated with some strategies for defeating such scepticism. These strategies appeal to associations between metaphysical modality and the following: objective probability, counterfactuals and distinctive explanatory value.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | (c) 2018 The Aristotelian Society This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume xcii following peer review. The version of record Divers, J (2018) W(h)ither Metaphysical Necessity? Aristotelean Society Supplementary Volume, 92 (1). pp. 1-25. ISSN 0309-7013 is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/aky008. |
Keywords: | Metaphysical Necessity; Modal Scepticism; Quine; Counterfactuals; Objective Probability |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Funding Information: | Funder Grant number Leverhulme Trust RPG-2016-263 |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 01 Jun 2018 15:18 |
Last Modified: | 22 Jan 2021 15:41 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press (OUP) |
Identification Number: | 10.1093/arisup/aky008 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:131388 |