Kant and Degrees of Responsibility

Abstract

Kant views every human action as either entirely determined by natural necessity or entirely free. In viewing human action this way, it is unclear how he can account for degrees of responsibility. In this article, I consider three recent attempts to accommodate degrees of responsibility within Kant's framework, but argue that none of them are satisfying. In the end, I claim that transcendental idealism constrains Kant such that he cannot provide an adequate account of degrees of responsibility.

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Item Type:	Article
Authors/Creators:	Saunders, J https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1290-275X
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:	(c) 2018, Society for Applied Philosophy, John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Saunders, J (2018) Kant and Degrees of Responsibility. Journal of Applied Philosophy. which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12293 This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
Dates:	Published: 15 February 2019 Published (online): 4 January 2018 Accepted: 8 November 2017
Institution:	The University of Leeds
Academic Units:	The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > Inter-Disciplinary Ethics Applied (Leeds)
Depositing User:	Symplectic Publications
Date Deposited:	01 Dec 2017 11:51
Last Modified:	04 Jan 2020 01:38
Status:	Published
Publisher:	Wiley
Identification Number:	10.1111/japp.12293
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID):	oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:124722

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Kant and Degrees of Responsibility

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