Divers, J orcid.org/0000-0002-1286-6587 (2017) How Skeptical Is Quine’s “Modal Skepticism”? The Monist, 100 (2). pp. 194-210. ISSN 0026-9662
Abstract
Following a logistical explication of metaphysics Quine can be cast as an ideological antirealist about modality. However, it is not clear that Quine deserves to be called a modal skeptic since, I argue, he does not hold some of the extreme views about modality that are often associated with him. Moreover, while Quine’s convictions about truth make many forms of antirealism unacceptable to him, he might be construed as a non-skeptical modal quasi-realist (a la Blackburn). I suggest further that the application of this paradigm to metaphysical necessity might proceed from the association of that concept with those explored in Quine’s “Natural Kinds”.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © The Author, 2017. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. This is a pre-copy edited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in The Monist following peer review. The version of record, John Divers; How Skeptical Is Quine’s “Modal Skepticism”?, The Monist, Volume 100, Issue 2, 1 April 2017, Pages 194–210, is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onx004. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | Quine, Modality, Skepticism |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 16 Oct 2017 11:07 |
Last Modified: | 11 Apr 2019 00:41 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
Identification Number: | 10.1093/monist/onx004 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:122483 |