Lang, G (2017) XII—What Follows from Defensive Non-Liability? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 117 (3). pp. 231-252. ISSN 0066-7374
Abstract
Theories of self-defence tend to invest heavily in ‘liability justifications’: if the Attacker is liable to have defensive violence deployed against him by the Defender, then he will not be wronged by such violence, and self-defence becomes, as a result, morally unproblematic. This paper contends that liability justifications are overrated. The deeper contribution to an explanation of why defensive permissions exist is made by the Defender’s non-liability. Drawing on both canonical cases of self-defence, featuring Culpable Attackers, and more penumbral cases of self-defence, involving Non-Responsible Threats, a case is assembled for the ‘Non-Liability First Account’ of self-defence.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2017 The Aristotelian Society. This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society following peer review. The version of record: Gerald Lang; XII—What Follows from Defensive Non-Liability?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 117, Issue 3, 1 October 2017, Pages 231–252, is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aox013. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 28 Jul 2017 09:47 |
Last Modified: | 15 Sep 2019 00:38 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
Identification Number: | 10.1093/arisoc/aox013 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:119587 |