Normative Reference Magnets

Abstract

The concept of moral wrongness, many think, has a distinctive kind of referential stability, brought out by moral twin earth cases. This article offers a new account of the source of this stability, deriving it from a metaphysics of content: “substantive” radical interpretation, and first-order normative assumptions. This story is distinguished from extant “reference magnetic” explanations of the phenomenon, and objections and replies are considered.

Metadata

Item Type:	Article
Authors/Creators:	Williams, JRG https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4831-2954
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:	(c) 2018 by Cornell University. This is an author produced version of a paper published in The Philosophical Review. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy.
Keywords:	naturalness; metaethics; metasemantics; radical interpretation
Dates:	Published: 1 January 2018 Published (online): 1 January 2018 Accepted: 9 June 2017
Institution:	The University of Leeds
Academic Units:	The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)
Funding Information:	Funder Grant number EU - European Union 312938
Depositing User:	Symplectic Publications
Date Deposited:	13 Jun 2017 07:55
Last Modified:	17 Apr 2018 08:07
Status:	Published
Publisher:	Duke University Press
Identification Number:	10.1215/00318108-4230057
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID):	oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:117576

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Normative Reference Magnets

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