Vayrynen, P orcid.org/0000-0003-4066-8577 (2018) Doubts about Moral Perception. In: Bergqvist, A and Cowan, R, (eds.) Evaluative Perception. Mind Association Occasional Series . Oxford University Press ISBN 9780198786054
Abstract
This chapter defends doubts about the existence of genuine moral perception, understood as the claim that at least some moral properties figure in the contents of perceptual experience. The doubts are local: even if perceptual experiences generally can be cognitively penetrable and rich, standard examples of moral perception are better explained as habitual implicit inferences or transitions in thought. The chapter sketches a model on which the relevant transitions in thought can be psychologically immediate depending on how readily and reliably non-evaluative perceptual inputs, jointly with the subject’s background moral beliefs, training, and habituation, trigger the kinds of phenomenological responses that moral agents are disposed to have when they represent things as being morally a certain way. It is then argued that this rival account of moral experience explains at least as much as the moral perception hypothesis but is simpler and (at least by one relevant measure) more unified.
Metadata
Item Type: | Book Section |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | (c) 2018, the several contributors. This is an author produced version of a chapter published in Evaluative Perception, edited by A. Bergqvist & R. Cowan and published by Oxford University Press. Reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press. |
Keywords: | moral perception, perceptual experience, moral properties, cognitive penetration, phenomenal contrast arguments, metaethics |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 05 Apr 2017 11:04 |
Last Modified: | 01 Jun 2020 00:38 |
Published Version: | https://global.oup.com/academic/product/evaluative... |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
Series Name: | Mind Association Occasional Series |
Identification Number: | 10.1093/oso/9780198786054.003.0006 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:114536 |