Williams, JRG orcid.org/0000-0003-4831-2954 (2014) Decision-Making Under Indeterminacy. Philosophers' Imprint, 14. 4. pp. 1-34. ISSN 1533-628X
Abstract
Decisions are made under uncertainty when there are distinct outcomes of a given action, and one is uncertain to which the act will lead. Decisions are made under indeterminacy when there are distinct outcomes of a given action, and it is indeterminate to which the act will lead. This paper develops a theory of (synchronic and diachronic) decision-making under indeterminacy that portrays the rational response to such situations as inconstant. Rational agents have to capriciously and randomly choose how to resolve the indeterminacy relevant to a given choice-situation, but such capricious choices once made constrain how they will choose in the future. The account is illustrated by the case of self-interested action in situations where it is indeterminate whether you yourself will survive to benefit or suffer the consequences. The conclusion emphasizes some distinctive anti-hedging predictions of the account.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | (c) 2014, Author. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. Please contact mpub-help@umich.edu to use this work in a way not covered by the license. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 07 Mar 2017 14:01 |
Last Modified: | 18 Nov 2020 14:28 |
Published Version: | http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0014.004 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Michigan Publishing |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:113311 |