Baker, D and Woods, J (2015) How Expressivists Can and Should Explain Inconsistency. Ethics, 125 (2). pp. 391-424. ISSN 0014-1704
Abstract
We argue that several difficulties facing expressivist solutions to the Frege-Geach problem are paralleled by almost exactly analogous problems facing realist semantic theories. We show that by adopting a variation on a prominent realist solution, the expressivist brings her account of logical consequence closer to philosophical orthodoxy. Our discussion also demonstrates that a standard objection to expressivism is based on a misinterpretation of the Frege-Geach problem and that the expressivist can appeal to a wide range of attitudinal conflicts in her semantic theorizing—far wider than Mark Schroeder, for example, allows in his recent work.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 14 Feb 2017 11:31 |
Last Modified: | 14 Feb 2017 11:31 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1086/678371 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | University of Chicago Press |
Identification Number: | 10.1086/678371 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:108292 |