Vayrynen, P orcid.org/0000-0003-4066-8577 (2016) Thick Ethical Concepts. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ISSN 1095-5054
Abstract
Evaluative terms and concepts are often divided into “thin” and “thick”. We don’t evaluate actions and persons merely as good or bad, or right or wrong, but also as kind, courageous, tactful, selfish, boorish, and cruel. The latter evaluative concepts are "descriptively thick": their application somehow involves both evaluation and a substantial amount of non-evaluative description. This article surveys various attempts to answer four fundamental questions about thick terms and concepts. (1) A “combination question”: how exactly do thick terms and concepts relate evaluation and non-evaluative description? (2) A “location question”: is evaluation somehow inherent to thick terms and concepts, such as perhaps an aspect of their meaning, or merely a feature of their use? (3) A “delineation question”: how do thick terms differ from the thin and from other kinds of evaluative terms? (4) Given answers to these questions, what broader philosophical significance and applications might thick concepts have?
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Keywords: | metaethics; moral semantics; thick concepts; fact-value distinction |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 26 Sep 2016 13:52 |
Last Modified: | 05 Oct 2017 15:10 |
Published Version: | http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thick-ethical-co... |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Stanford University |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:105093 |