Saatsi, J orcid.org/0000-0002-8440-8761 (2017) Dynamical Systems Theory and Explanatory Indispensability. In: Philosophy of Science. Philosophy of Science Association Biennial Meeting 2016, 02-05 Nov 2016, Atlanta, GA, USA. University of Chicago Press , pp. 892-904.
Abstract
I examine explanations’ realist commitments in relation to dynamical systems theory. First I rebut an ‘explanatory indispensability argument’ for mathematical realism from the explanatory power of phase spaces. Then I critically consider a possible way of strengthening the indispensability argument by reference to attractors in dynamical systems theory. The take-home message is that understanding of the modal character of explanations (in dynamical systems theory) can undermine Platonist arguments from explanatory indispensability.
Metadata
Item Type: | Proceedings Paper |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2017 by the Philosophy of Science Association. Reproduced in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 19 Jul 2016 13:53 |
Last Modified: | 11 Jan 2023 13:07 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | University of Chicago Press |
Identification Number: | 10.1086/693965 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:102123 |