Lang, GR (2016) Rawlsian Incentives and the Freedom Objection. Journal of Social Philosophy, 47 (2). 6. pp. 231-249. ISSN 0047-2786 (Submitted)
Abstract
In a hugely significant and much discussed series of writings, G. A. Cohen attacks John Rawls's “justice as fairness” for permitting morally arbitrary inequalities. On Cohen's view, these inequalities are at odds with the egalitarian ethos that ought, by Rawls's own lights, to govern the attitudes and actions of agents in a Rawlsian society.1 One potential reply which Cohen canvasses on behalf of Rawlsians, and then proceeds to attack, is the “Freedom Objection.”2 The Freedom Objection has received some attention, but there is much more to say about it. In my view, the Freedom Objection constitutes an important line of the Rawlsian's defense against Cohen's criticisms, and it remains underappreciated why and how Cohen's responses to it are unsatisfactory.3 The article unfolds as follows. Section I deals with necessary points of exposition: I supply some brief background to Cohen's general critique of Rawls's justice as fairness, and then I go on to outline the Freedom Objection, which comes in two versions. In section II, I outline and then assess Cohen's response to the “First Version” of the Freedom Objection, which has received comparatively little examination thus far. Then, in section III, I outline and assess Cohen's way of dealing with the “Second Version” of the Freedom Objection. A notable inconsistency between Cohen's treatment of the First Version and his treatment of the Second Version is also identified in section III. The discussion concludes, in section IV, with a further suggestion of why Cohen may find it more difficult than he thinks to escape commitment to the legal enforcement of occupational choice.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2016, Wiley. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: "Lang, G. (2016), Rawlsian Incentives and the Freedom Objection. J Soc Philos, 47: 231–249 " which has been published in final form at http://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12149. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving. |
Keywords: | Rawls; Cohen; Freedom; Incentives; Difference principle |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 31 Oct 2016 14:43 |
Last Modified: | 08 Jun 2018 00:38 |
Published Version: | http://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12149 |
Status: | Submitted |
Publisher: | Wiley |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/josp.12149 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:100677 |