Nonclassical minds and indeterminate survival

Abstract

Revisionary theories of logic or truth require revisionary theories of mind. This essay outlines nonclassically based theories of rational belief, desire, and decision making, singling out the supervaluational family for special attention. To see these nonclassical theories of mind in action, this essay examines a debate between David Lewis and Derek Parfit over what matters in survival. Lewis argued that indeterminacy in personal identity allows caring about psychological connectedness and caring about personal identity to amount to the same thing. The essay argues that Lewis's treatment of two of Parfit's puzzle cases—degreed survival and fission—presuppose different nonclassical treatments of belief and desire.

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Authors/Creators:	Williams, JRG https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4831-2954
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:	© 2014 by Cornell University. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Philosophical Review. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy.
Dates:	Published: October 2014
Institution:	The University of Leeds
Academic Units:	The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)
Depositing User:	Symplectic Publications
Date Deposited:	07 Jun 2016 11:01
Last Modified:	28 Jan 2022 12:34
Published Version:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2749710
Status:	Published
Publisher:	Duke University Press
Identification Number:	https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2749710

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Nonclassical minds and indeterminate survival

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