Scrutton, AP orcid.org/0000-0002-8335-7464 (2016) Why not believe in an evil God? Pragmatic encroachment and some implications for philosophy of religion. Religious Studies, 52 (3). pp. 345-360. ISSN 0034-4125
Abstract
Pointing to broad symmetries between the idea that God is omniscient, omnipotent, and all-good, and the idea that God is omniscient, omnipotent, but all-evil, the evil-God challenge raises the question of why theists should prefer one over the other. I respond to this challenge by drawing on a recent theory in epistemology, pragmatic encroachment, which asserts that practical considerations can alter the epistemic status of beliefs. I then explore some of the implications of my argument for how we do philosophy of religion, arguing that practical and contextual as well as alethic considerations are properly central to the discipline.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2015 Cambridge University Press. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Religious Studies. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Leeds |
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > Theology and Religious Studies (Leeds) |
Funding Information: | Funder Grant number MIND Association Scrutton Fellowship |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
Date Deposited: | 18 Jun 2015 13:32 |
Last Modified: | 24 Oct 2016 22:07 |
Published Version: | https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0034412515000360 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Cambridge University Press |
Identification Number: | 10.1017/S0034412515000360 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:87140 |