Bradley, D (2021) Objective Bayesianism and the Abductivist Response to Scepticism. Episteme. ISSN 1742-3600
Abstract
An important line of response to scepticism appeals to the best explanation. But anti-sceptics have not engaged much with work on explanation in the philosophy of science. I plan to investigate whether plausible assumptions about best explanations really do favour anti-scepticism. I will argue that there are ways of constructing sceptical hypotheses in which the assumptions do favour anti-scepticism, but the size of the support for anti-scepticism is small.
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. | ||||
Keywords: | Scepticism abductivism; best explanation; Principles of Indifference; objective Bayesianism | ||||
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Institution: | The University of Leeds | ||||
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) | ||||
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Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications | ||||
Date Deposited: | 16 Oct 2020 14:43 | ||||
Last Modified: | 14 Apr 2021 07:33 | ||||
Status: | Published online | ||||
Publisher: | Cambridge University Press | ||||
Identification Number: | https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2020.54 |
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