How (not) to think about the sense of ‘able’ relevant to free will

Kittle, S (2021) How (not) to think about the sense of ‘able’ relevant to free will. Inquiry, 65 (10). pp. 1289-1307. ISSN 0020-174X



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Keywords: Free will; ability; moral responsibility; able; can
  • Accepted: 30 June 2020
  • Published (online): 30 March 2021
  • Published: 30 March 2021
Institution: The University of Leeds
Academic Units: The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)
Depositing User: Symplectic Publications
Date Deposited: 02 Oct 2020 12:09
Last Modified: 17 Nov 2022 11:37
Status: Published
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Identification Number: