Williams, JRG orcid.org/0000-0003-4831-2954 (2018) Rational Illogicality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 96 (1). pp. 127-141. ISSN 0004-8402
Abstract
Many accounts of structural rationality give a special role to logic. This paper reviews the problem case of clear-eyed logical uncertainty. An account of rational norms on belief that does not give a special role to logic is developed: doxastic probabilism.
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2017 Australasian Association of Philosophy . This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy on 15 Jun 2017, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/00048402.2017.1323933. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. | ||||
Keywords: | logic, rationality, Bayesian, probabilism, uncertainty, accuracy | ||||
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Institution: | The University of Leeds | ||||
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) | ||||
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Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications | ||||
Date Deposited: | 11 May 2017 12:30 | ||||
Last Modified: | 15 Dec 2018 01:38 | ||||
Status: | Published | ||||
Publisher: | Taylor & Francis | ||||
Identification Number: | https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2017.1323933 |