Explanatory Abstractions

A number of philosophers have recently suggested that some abstract, plausibly non-causal and/or mathematical explanations explain in a way that is radically different from the way causal explanations explain. While causal explanations explain by providing information about causal dependence, some abstract explanations allegedly explain in a way tied to the independence of the explanandum from the micro-details or causal laws, for example. We oppose this recent trend to regard abstractions as explanatory in some sui generis way, and argue that a prominent account of causal explanation can be naturally extended to capture explanations that radically abstract away from micro-physical and causal-nomological details. To this end, we distinguish different senses in which an explanation can be more or less abstract, and analyse the connection between an explanation's abstractness and its causal power. According to our analysis, abstract explanations have much in common with counterfactual causal explanations.