Chen, Bo, Fujishige, Satoru and Yang, Zaifu orcid.org/0000-0002-3265-7109 (2016) Random Decentralized Market Processes for Stable Job Matchings with Competitive Salaries. Journal of Economic Theory. pp. 25-36. ISSN 0022-0531
Abstract
We analyze a decentralized process in a basic labor market where finitely many heterogeneous firms and workers meet directly and randomly in pursuit of higher payoffs over time and agents may behave myopically. We introduce a general random decentralized market process that almost surely converges in finite time to a competitive equilibrium of the market. A key proposition en route to this result exhibits a finite sequence of successive bilateral trades from an arbitrary initial market state to a stable matching between firms and workers with a scheme of competitive salary offers.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details |
Keywords: | Competitive salary,Decentralized market,Job matching,Random path,Stability |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > Economics and Related Studies (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 16 May 2016 13:19 |
Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2025 23:07 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.04.003 |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1016/j.jet.2016.04.003 |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:99299 |
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