McHardy, J., Reynolds, M. and Trotter, S. (2005) On the Economics of Integrated Ticketing. Working Paper. Department of Economics, University of Sheffield ISSN 1749-8368
Abstract
In this paper we explore alternative pricing and regulatory strategies within a simple transport network with Cournot duopoly and differentiated demands. We show that whilst firms always prefer to offer integrated ticketing, a social planner will not. With integrated ticketing, the firms always prefer complete collusion but there is not a uniform ranking of some of the less collusive regimes. Society generally prefers the less collusive regimes to complete collusion but prefers some collusion to independent pricing.
Metadata
Item Type: | Monograph |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | The Sheffield Economics Research Paper (SERP) series offers a forum for the research output of the academic staff and research students of the Department of Economics, University of Sheffield. Papers are reviewed for quality and presentation by a departmental editor. However, the contents and opinions expressed remain the responsibility of the authors. All papers may be downloaded free on the understanding that the contents are preliminary and therefore permission from the author(s) should be sought before they are referenced. |
Keywords: | integrated ticketing, duopoly, collusion |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Department of Economics (Sheffield) > Sheffield Economics Research Papers Series |
Depositing User: | Repository Officer |
Date Deposited: | 20 Oct 2009 13:18 |
Last Modified: | 09 Jun 2014 04:23 |
Published Version: | http://www.shef.ac.uk/economics/research/serps/yea... |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Department of Economics, University of Sheffield |
Identification Number: | Sheffield Economic Research Paper Series 2005006 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:9913 |