Leech, J. (2016) X—The Mereology of Representation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 116 (2). pp. 205-228. ISSN 0066-7374
Abstract
Mental representations – like many other things – seem to have parts. However, it isn’t clear how to properly understand the idea of a part of a representation. In this paper I shed new light on how representations can have a mereology. In particular, it has been recognized that there is a mereological element to Kant’s distinction between two kinds of representations: intuitions and concepts. A concept depends upon its parts, whereas an intuition is prior to its parts. The paper thus focuses on an exploration of how to make sense of the parts and wholes of intuitions and concepts.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2016 The Aristotelian Society. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 01 Apr 2016 14:12 |
Last Modified: | 27 Sep 2018 00:38 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aow010 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1093/arisoc/aow010 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:97507 |