Byerly, T.R. (2015) Collective Virtue. Journal of Value Inquiry. ISSN 1573-0492
Abstract
In this paper, we aim to advance the nascent discussion of collective virtue in three ways. First, in section 1, we offer two new arguments for the existence of collective virtues. Second, in section 2, we offer a new account of the nature of collective virtues in general which has significant advantages over the leading rival account of the nature of collective virtues. Third, in section 3, we contribute to the project of classifying collective virtues by distinguishing between collective virtues which have individual virtue analogues from those that do not, and by offering examples of some of the distinctively collective virtues which have no individual analogues. We argue that distinctively collective virtues provide a profitable place of focus for future work on collective virtue, since analyses of these virtues cannot be derived in a straightforward manner from analyses of their individual virtue analogues.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2015 Springer. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in The Journal of Value Inquiry. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 11 Feb 2016 16:04 |
Last Modified: | 27 Feb 2016 01:38 |
Published Version: | https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10790-015-9484-y |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Springer Verlag (Germany) |
Identification Number: | 10.1007/s10790-015-9484-y |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:94255 |