Faulkner, P. (2014) A Virtue Theory of Testimony. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 114 (2pt2). pp. 189-211. ISSN 0066-7374
Abstract
This paper aims to outline, evaluate, and ultimately reject a virtue epistemic theory of testimony before proposing a virtue ethical theory. Trust and trustworthiness, it is proposed, are ethical virtues; and from these ethical virtues, epistemic consequences follow.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2014 The Aristotelian Society. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 20 Jan 2016 11:15 |
Last Modified: | 02 Jul 2016 00:58 |
Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2014.00370.x |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Wiley |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2014.00370.x |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:93969 |