Lenman, J.W. (2013) Ethics without Errors. Ratio, 26 (4). 391 - 409 . ISSN 0034-0006
Abstract
I argue against the claim that we should adopt a moral error theory. The intelligibility of our moral practice need offer no questionable metaphysical hostages to fortune. The two most credible policy recommendations that might follow from moral error theory, abolitionism and prescriptive fictionalism, are not very credible.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in Ratio. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 22 Jan 2016 14:48 |
Last Modified: | 11 Mar 2016 01:05 |
Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/rati.12029 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Wiley |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/rati.12029 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:93169 |