Lenman, J.W. (2014) Gibbardian Humility: Moral Fallibility and Moral Smugness. Journal of Value Inquiry, 48 (2). 235 - 245. ISSN 0022-5363
Abstract
Andy Egan objects to quasi-realism that quasi-realists are committed to a form of smugness: when confronted with cases of fundamental disagreement, the quasi-realist must see him/herself as immune to moral error in a way that others are not. I urge that the concern can be tamed by considering the vice of smugness and the role it and its corresponding virtue should play in moral conversations. Here the quasi-realist need suppose no asymmetry to obtain between the level of epistemic humility he is prepared to extend to of moral disagreement and the level he expects from others. Such considerations suffice to tame Egan’s concern providing we follow Allan Gibbard in understanding the quasi-realist to be committed only to a modest and not to a grandiose form of moral objectivity.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Editors: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in Journal of Value Inquiry. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy |
Keywords: | Andy Egan; Sharon Street; Allan Gibbard; Quasi-realism; Expressivism; Mind-independence |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 22 Jan 2016 15:31 |
Last Modified: | 09 Mar 2016 00:31 |
Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10790-014-9420-6 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Springer |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1007/s10790-014-9420-6 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:93155 |