Bauso, D. and Reddy, P.V. (2010) Robust allocation rules in dynamical cooperative TU games. In: CDC. 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, 15-17 Dec 2010, Atlanta, GA. IEEE , 1504 - 1509.
Abstract
Robust dynamic coalitional TU games are repeated TU games where the values of the coalitions are unknown but bounded variables. We set up the game supposing that the Game Designer uses a vague measure of the extra reward that each coalition has received up to the current time to re-adjust the allocations among the players. As main result, we provide a constructive method for designing allocation rules that converge to the core of the average game. Both the set up and the solution approach also provide an insight on commonalities between coalitional games and stability theory.
Metadata
Item Type: | Proceedings Paper |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2010 IEEE. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Engineering (Sheffield) > Department of Automatic Control and Systems Engineering (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 03 Mar 2016 16:54 |
Last Modified: | 19 Dec 2022 13:32 |
Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2010.5718036 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | IEEE |
Identification Number: | 10.1109/CDC.2010.5718036 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:89738 |