Bauso, D., Lehrer, E., Solan, E. et al. (1 more author) (2015) Attainability in Repeated Games with Vector Payoffs. Mathematics of Operations Research, 40 (3). pp. 739-755. ISSN 0364-765X
Abstract
We introduce the concept of attainable sets of payoffs in two-player repeated games with vector payoffs. A set of payoff vectors is called {\em attainable} if player 1 can ensure that there is a finite horizon $T$ such that after time $T$ the distance between the set and the cumulative payoff is arbitrarily small, regardless of what strategy player 2 is using. This paper focuses on the case where the attainable set consists of one payoff vector. In this case the vector is called an attainable vector. We study properties of the set of attainable vectors, and characterize when a specific vector is attainable and when every vector is attainable.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © INFORMS 2015. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in Mathematics of Operations Research. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | math.OC; math.OC; cs.GT |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Engineering (Sheffield) > Department of Automatic Control and Systems Engineering (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 10 Sep 2015 13:07 |
Last Modified: | 17 Mar 2016 04:00 |
Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.2014.0693 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | INFORMS |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1287/moor.2014.0693 |
Related URLs: | |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:89714 |