Bos, Olivier, Roussillon, Beatrice and Schweinzer, Paul orcid.org/0000-0002-6437-7224 (2016) Agreeing on efficient emissions reduction. Scandinavian Journal of Economics. pp. 1-32. ISSN 1467-9442
Abstract
We propose a simple mechanism providing incentives to reduce harmful emissions to their efficient level without infracting upon productive efficiency. The mechanism employs a contest creating incentives among participating nations to simultaneously exert efficient productive and efficient abatement efforts. Participation in the most stylised form of the scheme is voluntary and individually rational; all rules are mutually agreeable and are unanimously adopted if proposed. The scheme balances its budget and requires no principal. In a perhaps more realistic stochastic output version which could potentially inform policy decisions, we show that the transfers required by the efficient mechanism create a mutual insurance motive which may serve as effective rationale for the (gradual) formation of International Environmental Agreements.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | (c) The editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2015. This is an author produced version of a paper accepted for publication in Scandinavian Journal of Economics. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Keywords: | Climate policy,Contests,Agreements |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of York |
Academic Units: | The University of York > Faculty of Social Sciences (York) > Economics and Related Studies (York) |
Depositing User: | Pure (York) |
Date Deposited: | 06 Oct 2015 13:49 |
Last Modified: | 25 Oct 2024 23:53 |
Published Version: | https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12164 |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/sjoe.12164 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:88389 |
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