Gregory-Smith, I. (2012) Chief executive pay and remuneration committee independence. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 74 (4). 510 - 531. ISSN 0305-9049
Abstract
This article tests the impact of remuneration committee independence on Chief Executive (CEO) pay. FTSE350 companies between 1996 and 2008 are used to assess whether remuneration committees facilitate optimal contracting or whether CEOs capture the pay-setting process and inflate their own remuneration. This panel has a number of advantages over prior samples and, in particular, contains a more comprehensive assessment of non-executive directors' independence. No evidence of a relationship between CEO pay and director independence is found, challenging the theory of managerial power and the received wisdom of institutional guidance. © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Department of Economics, University of Oxford.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Department of Economics, University of Oxford, 2011. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Social Sciences (Sheffield) > Department of Economics (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 09 Jun 2015 17:32 |
Last Modified: | 20 Mar 2018 18:42 |
Published Version: | https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0084.2011.00660.... |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Wiley |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1111/j.1468-0084.2011.00660.x |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:86812 |