Leech, J. (2014) Making Modal Distinctions: Kant on the possible, the actual, and the intuitive intellect. Kantian Review, 3 (19). pp. 339-365. ISSN 1369-4154
Abstract
One striking contrast that Kant draws between the kind of cognitive capacities that humans have, and alternative kinds of intellect, concerns modal concepts. Whilst, `it is absolutely necessary for the human understanding to distinguish between the possibility and the actuality of things' (5:401), the very distinction between possibility and actuality would not arise for an intuitive understanding. The aim of this paper is to explore in more detail how the functioning of these cognitive capacities relates to modal concepts, and to provide a model of the intuitive understanding, in order to draw some general lessons for our ability to make modal judgements, and the function of such judgements.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Authors/Creators: |
|
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © 2014 Kantian Review. Article available under the terms of the CC-BY-NC-ND license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). |
Dates: |
|
Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Sheffield |
Date Deposited: | 19 Sep 2016 11:32 |
Last Modified: | 30 Apr 2020 08:23 |
Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1369415414000156 |
Status: | Published |
Publisher: | Cambridge University Press |
Refereed: | Yes |
Identification Number: | 10.1017/S1369415414000156 |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:81838 |
Download
Filename: Making Modal Distinctions FINAL VERSION.pdf
Licence: CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0