Olson, E.T. (2003) Was Jekyll Hyde? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66 (2). pp. 328-348. ISSN 0031-8205
Abstract
Many philosophers say that two or more people or thinking beings could share a single human being in a split-personality case, if only the personalities were sufficiently independent and individually well integrated. I argue that this view is incompatible with our being material things, and conclude that there could never be two or more people in a split-personality case. This refutes the view, almost universally held, that facts about mental unity and disunity determine how many people there are. I suggest that the number of human people is simply the number of appropriately endowed human animals.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Authors/Creators: |
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | Reprinted with permission from the International Phenomenological Society. |
Dates: |
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Institution: | The University of Sheffield |
Academic Units: | The University of Sheffield > Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Sheffield) > Department of Philosophy (Sheffield) |
Depositing User: | Sherpa Assistant |
Date Deposited: | 11 Nov 2005 |
Last Modified: | 08 Jun 2014 06:27 |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Open Archives Initiative ID (OAI ID): | oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:771 |